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 The adoption of EVA as a compensation and management plan, generally, impacts positively the 
performance of companies adopting this method.  However, this paper examines whether the adoption 
of the EVA framework enhances the firm’s performance and gauge the long-term effects of such an 
adoption on the firm’s value. It also assesses whether the market reacts to the announcement of the 
adoption of EVA as a compensation system. Moreover, the paper fills this gap in research literature by 
showing whether or not EVA adoption leads to a significant increase in firm value as reflected by its 
market prices on the long run. Growing evidence in research indicates that the stock market does not 
incorporate all firm information into the stock price quickly and completely. Therefore, the critique 
that contemporaneous association between price and EVA does not reflect reality is likely to be correct. 
However, this paper takes a different action. The basic contention is that although prices adjust slowly 
to information, long horizons are sufficiently long for markets to incorporate almost all relevant 
information into prices.  The study sample consists of 89 US firms adopted EVA as a compensation 
system. It compares the performance of adopting firms to that of selected matching firms and to the 
market indexes, particularly, the S&P500 portfolio. Then it uses two common aggregating methods to 
test the event of adopting EVA by different US firms namely the CAR and BHAR methods. The results 
obtained, however, showed a slight improvement in the performance of companies adopting EVA 
within five years from the date of adoption. 
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1. Introduction 
It is generally accepted that the normative role of the executive manager is to maximize firm value (Wallace, 1997; Malmi & 
Ikaheimo, 2003). But a long-standing problem for the owners of the firm has been that a fiduciary role by the manager does not 
occur naturally. There must be some form of compensation design that induces the required management behaviour.  Any 
design, in turn, requires a measure of firm performance. How do we know that a manager has increased firm value?  One 
traditional measure is Share Price (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). However, Share Price depends on factors beyond management 
control (Sloan, 1993; Lambert, 1993). Furthermore, in the short run, maximising share price might not always be aligned with 
maximising the firm’s intrinsic value (Mramor & Valentincic, 2001). Other traditional measures used in assessing managers’ 
performance include earnings, return on assets, return on investment and other cash flow measures. However, there are well-
known problems with these measures (subjectivity and ease of manipulation). The search was therefore on for new performance 
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measures that would improve on the traditional accounting-based measures. Practitioners obliged. Consulting firms began 
marketing their own value based performance measures (Myers, 1997). The most prominent of these was Stern and Stewart’s 
Economic Value Added (EVA) (Stern & Stewart, 1991). Stewart (1994, p.75) proclaimed that “EVA stands well out from the 
crowd as the single best measure of value creation on a continuous basis”, and that “EVA is almost 50% better than its closest 
accounting-based competitor (i.e. earnings), in explaining changes in shareholder wealth”. However, although these measures 
were driven by practitioners, value-based ideas had been known for more than a century before they were marketed by consulting 
firms. Wallace (1997) states that Alfred Marshall mentioned the residual income concept in 1890. This same measure was also 
discussed by Canning (1929) and Preinreich (1937) who referred to it as excess earnings, while Edey (1957) referred to it as 
super-profits. The basic idea of this measure is that unless a business “returns a profit that is greater than its cost of capital, it 
does not create wealth; it destroys it.” (Drucker, 1995, p.59). Previous research has examined whether the adoption of EVA’s 
incentive compensation plan has any impact on managers’ decision making (Wallace, 1997; Kleiman, 1999; Hogan & Lewis, 
2005). All of this empirical research has the common assumption that the adoption of the EVA compensation system will 
rationalize a firm’s investment decision and will lead to using the existing assets more efficiently to generate more residual 
income and, hence, to maximize shareholders’ wealth, as well. These studies tested EVA adoption effects for up to five years 
after adoption. A major limitation in the existing literature is that the focus was on changes in the manager's behaviour as 
reflected by accounting fundamentals. Adoption of EVA is supposed to increase asset dispositions, repurchases, and dividends, 
while at the same time decrease new investments and accounts payable. However, if adopting EVA really led to optimal 
management decisions, the above effects may be necessarily observed. For example, a firm could have under-invested prior to 
adopting EVA. An optimal behaviour would see an increase in new investments rather than a decrease. Thus, even if EVA did 
induce the management to optimise firm value, the optimal change in the accounting variables may not always be in the same 
direction. This is probably why the various studies that studied the effect of EVA adoption have found different and often 
conflicting results (Wallace, 1997; Kleiman, 1999; Cahan et al., 2002; Hogan & Lewis, 2005; Balachandran, 2006). In short, 
while existing evidence points to a change in management decision, there is no evidence that adopting EVA increases value.   
Apart from management-behaviour effect studies mentioned above, the other line of enquiry focused on value relevance (Biddle 
et al., 1997; Lehn & Makhija, 1997). The general finding is that EVA actually has poorer explanatory power than other 
traditional performance metrics such as earnings. Surprisingly, we know of no study that has tested directly the value effect of 
EVA adoption. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by showing whether or not EVA adoption leads to a 
significant increase in firm value as reflected by its market prices in the long run. While we agree that in the short run, the 
market might be subject to a number of behavioural and informational inefficiencies. There is growing evidence that the stock 
market does not incorporate all firm information into the stock price quickly and completely. Therefore, the critique that 
contemporaneous association between price and EVA does not reflect reality is likely to be correct. However, we take a different 
take. Our basic contention is that although prices adjust slowly to information, long horizons are sufficiently long for markets 
to incorporate almost all relevant information into prices. In other words, our basic assumption is that markets are efficient in 
the long run (Fama, 1998, JFE, 49, 283-306). This paper will therefore examine whether the adoption of the EVA framework 
enhances the firm’s performance and to gauge the long-term effects of such an adoption on the firm’s value. It also assesses 
whether the market reacts to the announcement of the adoption of EVA as a compensation system. The event study methodology 
initially introduced by Fama et al. (1969) will be used to assess the impact of EVA’s adoption on a firm’s performance.  The 
adoption the trademarked EVA performance measure grew rapidly during the 1990s in the USA, but does not seem to be popular 
in Europe. For example, in the UK only four companies have reported the EVA as a performance and management tool.1  
The structure of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarises the main results of the previous studies that have 
investigated the impact of EVA adoption on a firm’s performance. Sections 3 and 4 describe the sample and the methodology 
respectively. Section 5 discusses the empirical results obtained and finally section 6 summarises the main conclusions. 
2. Previous studies 
To our knowledge, there are only two studies on stock price performance following adoption of EVA as a compensation 
measure. The first study focuses on the short-term market reaction to EVA adoption. Tortella & Brusco (2003) used a sample 
of 65 EVA adopter firms and compared the daily abnormal return of adopting firms to that of two index portfolios. They used 
a window of 30 days prior to the adoption and 100 days post the adoption.  Their results indicate that the daily cumulative 
average abnormal return is insignificant throughout the post event window. They conclude that the market does not react to the 
adoption of EVA in the short run. Ferguson et al. (2005), on the other hand, do a long-term event study on EVA adoption. They 
use a list of 65 EVA adopter firms provided by Stern Stewart & Co. However, our study differs in many respects. First, we use 
a larger sample of 89 firms, which is likely to improve the statistical credence of our empirical results. Moreover, our sample 
goes to 2001 while their sample ends in 1998. Second, they rely exclusively on the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) concept 
in their analysis. Abnormal returns have their own shortcomings and have been criticised severely for prompting certain biases 
 
1 These companies are Tate & Lyle, GSK, Hanson (now Heidelberg) and Diageo. Source: Stern Stewart Ltd. London Branch dated March 15, 2012.  
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(Barber and Lyon, 1996, 1997; Fama, 1998). In this study we use both CAR and the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
concept. BHAR is well known for its ability to represent investor’s experience (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). Third, they use 
market model to estimate predicted or expected returns. This may suffer from the bad model problem (Fama, 1998). In this 
study we use matching control firms to calculate abnormal return or abnormal buy and hold return. The use of matching control 
firm is less likely to suffer from the bad model problem (Stuart, 2010). The other line of enquiry that is closely related to our 
objectives is the one that focused on the effect of EVA adoption on internal firm decisions such as financing and operating 
decisions. This kind of research was initiated by the seminal paper of Wallace (1997), and was then followed by several studies 
over the following decade (Kleiman, 1999; Cahan et al., 2002; Hogan & Lewis, 2005; Balachandran, 2006). The underlying 
assumption in the above studies is that firms adopting EVA will create the ability to enhance their profitability and maximize 
shareholder’s wealth. This can be achieved by increasing a firm’s ability to generate a large residual income and encourage 
managers to invest in those projects that can earn more than the cost of the capital invested. Furthermore, EVA’s proponents 
claim that the adoption of the EVA framework will affect the manager’s behaviour and lead to the best alignment of management 
interests with those of the shareholders (Stewart, 1991; Wallace, 1997). The existing empirical studies on the adoption of residual 
income-based performance incentives have found mixed results. Wallace’s (1997) study initiated this line of enquiry by 
addressing the changes in a number of firm decisions following the adoption of residual income or EVA measures. Wallace 
(1997) was been replicated by a number of scholars such as Kleiman (1999), Hogan & Lewis (2005) and Balachandran (2006). 
Wallace (1997) compared a group of forty companies adopting residual income or EVA as a compensation plan with the same 
number of control firms to examine whether the adoption of these measures, impacted the investing decisions, financing 
decisions, operating decisions and shareholder wealth. Kleiman (1999) extended Wallace’s sample to 71 firms, but focus 
exclusively on firms adopting EVA as an incentive compensation system. Kleiman (1999) found that EVA adoption led to 
higher stock return performance. Inconsistent with Wallace (1997), Kleiman’s (1999) results do not show any capital 
expenditure decline following adoption of EVA. On the other hand, he reports that EVA-adopting companies significantly 
increase their financial leverage, extend share repurchases, and enhance both operating margins and operating profits before 
depreciation. Hogan and Lewis (2005) used a sample of 108 firms that chose to adopt the economic profit plans (EPPs) as 
incentive compensation systems between 1983 and 1996 to examine whether the adoption would affect these firms’ operating, 
organizational, financial and compensation characteristics. The findings of Hogan & Lewis (2005) reveal that EPP adopter firms 
in general show a significant enhancement in operating performance relative to their past performance (pre-adoption period). In 
addition, they show a significant difference in investment behaviour, operating performance and value creation. This result is 
consistent with the notion that an EPP-based compensation system encourages managers to choose profitable projects that 
ultimately maximize shareholders’ wealth. However, they found significant differences between anticipated adopter firms and 
surprise adopter firms. The improved performance referred to above appears to have been driven mostly by anticipated adopters, 
which points to potential self-selection bias. The above studies looked at the adoption of EVA (or residual income) plans 
regardless of what measure was used before adoption. Balachandran (2006) argues that the original plan is important as adoption 
of EVA or residual income might actually increase or decrease investment pattern, even though the delivery of residual income 
would increase in both cases. This implies that firm value maximisation does not necessarily entail an increase or decrease in 
investments. Balachandran (2006) used a sample of 181 firms that adopted the residual income (RI)-based compensation 
incentive. These firms fell into two main categories: those which previously adopted earnings as a compensation plan and those 
which previously adopted return on investment (ROI) based compensation plan. He focused on two outputs, namely, the change 
in RI and the change in investment. His results show strong support for the view that RI-adopting firms do actually deliver 
higher RI after adoption. However, the results also show no significant change in investment pattern.  
 
3. Sample  
 
Our sample consists of 89 US firms that have adopted EVA as a compensation system. We follow Wallace (1997) and Kleiman 
(1999) and define the end of the first year of the company announcing its adoption of EVA as the event date (𝑡 = 0). The identity 
of adopting firms was found as follows. We began with Wallace’s (1997) 23 firms that adopted the EVA compensation plan. 
We then added the firms used by Kleiman (1999). This increased the number to 71 firms. Subsequently, we searched for 
additional firms using various databases where the EVA adoption was specifically mentioned. These comprise the Stern Stewart 
& Co. brochure, Lexis-Nexis, Proxy Statement, 10-Q report and Wall Street Journal. The majority of firms which adopted EVA 
have disclosed such information in their official release. We identified a total of 101 adopting firms in the period 1987- 2001. 
However, 12 EVA adopters were excluded because of lack of price/return and accounting data. Our final sample contains 89 
EVA adopters on NASDAQ, NYSE and American Stock Exchange Markets. Because we use both the market model and control 
firm approaches to estimate abnormal performance, each of the adopter firm was matched with a benchmark firm. We follow 
Wallace (1997) who uses the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to match the adopter and benchmark firms. We used three 
criteria for matching firm selection. First, the company should have the same 4-digits SIC code (Same industry sector). If we 
do not find a firm with 4 digits match, we choose the best match with a 3-digits SIC code. If there are several firms with the 
same 4 or 3 digit SIC code, then we select the nearest size using a combination of the total asset and number of outstanding 
common shares in the year prior to the year of adoption to match adopters and control firms. Finally, if a benchmark firm does 
not have sufficient monthly data during the event period, we select the next best benchmark in terms of SIC code and size.  
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The price and return data of both adopting and control firms were collected from CRSP database. Appendix 1 provides a 
breakdown of firms adopting EVA and the year of adoption, the main control firms and the SIC code respectively.  
 
Table 1 
EVA Adoption Years of Sample Companies (1987 – 2001) 
Year Number of Companies Percentage 
1987 1 1.12% 
1988 1 1.12% 
1989 1 1.12% 
1990 2 2.25% 
1991 1 1.12% 
1992 4 4.49% 
1993 10 11.24% 
1994 18 20.22% 
1995 13 14.61% 
1996 17 19.10% 
1997 8 8.99% 
1998 7 7.87% 
1999 4 4.49% 
2000 1 1.12% 
2001 1 1.12% 
Total 89 100% 
 
4. Method 
Defenders of Economic Value Added (EVA) claim that it helps to enhance the investment activity that leads to a notable market 
reaction (Stewart, 1991). The object this paper is to examine whether the adoption of EVA has the predicted positive effect on 
firm value. If EVA does indeed have such a positive effect on value, then the market should identify this change in the firm and 
react positively at least in the long run. If that is the case, then we should observe significant abnormal market performance (as 
measured by abnormal returns or abnormal buy and hold returns) either immediately (if the effect is true and the market is 
efficient), or slowly (if the market only absorbs information slowly). To test this claim we use an event study approach. Some 
event studies research has been dedicated to testing market efficiency. However, most of the event studies have been used to 
assess the impact of some events on some measure of the firm or investor wealth. Many studies have discussed and examined 
the long-term financial performances after the occurrences of certain events such as the IPO, mergers and acquisitions and the 
most popular event, cash dividends. One common feature of these studies is that of the classical event approach, which fully 
intended to investigate very short-term events. In a string of seminal papers, Barber & Lyon (1996, 1997) and Lyon, Barber, & 
Tsai (1999), revealed that the standard classical event study framework can lead to many partialities when applied to the 
measurement of long-term abnormal performances and recommended further study for such long-term events analysis. Further, 
Fama (1998) raised two important key issues regarding measuring long-term abnormal returns: first, the model’s ability to 
correct for risk when estimating abnormal returns is quite low and second, the estimation of abnormal returns is probably subject 
to a range of statistical biases. Thus, to avoid estimation and bad model problems, we use direct benchmarking using both the 
market index and a matched control firm. The event window is set to 60 months before and after the adoption date. In the 
literature there are two methods to test the events and detect a long-run abnormal stock return: the cumulative abnormal return 
(hereafter, CAR) and the Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (hereafter, BHAR). The main difference between CAR and BHAR is 
mainly attributed to the compounding of the monthly return; while BHAR incorporates the effect of compounding CAR does 
not (Barber & Lyon, 1997).  Regardless of the methodology used to measure the performance of the EVA adopter, CAR or 
BHAR, we need to measure the abnormal return. The abnormal return is the difference between the actual return and the 
benchmark return of a security. Events in the theory of finance can usually be classified as information that has not already been 
contained in the share’s market price.  Let 𝑅  be the return on adopter (event) firm 𝑖, and 𝑅  be the return on a benchmark 
stock. When we use the marked index as benchmark, then we simply set 𝑅 = 𝑅 , where 𝑅  is the return on the market 
portfolio. Accordingly abnormal returns are given by  𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅 −  𝑅       
 The average abnormal return (𝐴𝐴𝑅 ) during month s can be defined as: 
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where 𝐴𝑅  is the abnormal return estimator for security i and 𝑁  is the number of the companies in the sample during month t. 
The cumulative average abnormal return in the window of (𝑠 ,𝑠 ) is: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝐴𝐴𝑅   
The second method used to calculate the abnormal return is buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) which is defined as the 
compound returns on the event firm less the compound return on a control firm / reference portfolio- that is BHAR: 
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where   is the period of investment in months, 𝑅  is the return on the event firm (adopter firm) i in month t. 𝑅  is the benchmark 
returns. As our main method to test the event is BHAR it is more efficient to highlight the skewness problem inherited within 
the process of making inferences using BHAR. This problem is reported in Barber and Lyon (1997). In order to conduct the 
significance test in event time using BHAR, the following conventional t-statistic is used based on cross sectional data: 
i
BHARt
N
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where RAHB  is the sample mean, i  is the standard deviation, and N  is the number of EVA adopter firms. The compound 
nature of BHAR induces skewness in the above statistic. To circumvent this problem, we use a bootstrap correction, originally 
proposed by Johnson (1978):  





   ˆ6
1ˆ
3
1 2
N
SSNtSKadj   
Where ̂  is the coefficient of skewness, and / iS BHAR  . This adjustment was recommended by Lyon et al. (1999) to 
correct for potential skewness in BHAR returns. Kothari & Warner (1997) state that, drawing statistical inferences from a 
bootstrap approach is likely to be a better technique for statistical testing of long-term stock abnormal performance. However, 
while standard bootstrapping on the skewness-adjusted t-statistic does indeed address skewness concerns, it does not address 
the question of heteroscedasticity. In our case adoption takes place over a number of years. During these years there are periods 
where the market is highly volatile and others where it is relatively calm. Returns and, hence, abnormal returns, drawn from 
different periods are likely to have been drawn from distributions having different volatilities. The standard bootstrap does not 
correct for heteroscedasticity. The wild bootstrap, on the other hand, is designed to account for heteroscedasticity. Despite its 
properties, the wild bootstrap has unfortunately seen very little use in empirical finance.  The standard bootstrap draws samples 
(with replacement) from the set of estimated variable. In our case, we draw samples 
*
î   from the residual series
RAHBBHARii ̂ ). With the wild bootstrap the bootstrap samples 
*
î  are the product of the original residuals with an 
independent random variable, i , with zero mean and unit variance (that is, 
*ˆ ˆi i i  ). The bootstrap variance is guaranteed 
to be the same as that of the parent distribution. For example, for the standard normal case we have  
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However, the normal distribution is not appropriate when the data is skewed since 0)( 3 iE . Liu (1988) & Mammen (1993) 
suggest ways of obtaining 1)( 3 iE   but their sampling schemes do not preserve the kurtosis of the parent distribution. An 
alternative sampling scheme that preserves the mean, variance and kurtosis ( 0)( iE , and 1)()(
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skewness ( 0)( 3 iE ) was proposed by Davidson et al. (2007), namely  
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This latter scheme is preferred since we use the skewness adjusted t-statistic which corrects for skewness, and thus skewness is 
not an issue (with the adjustment of Johnson (1978) the parent distribution of the adjusted statistic is expected to be symmetric).  
A further serious problem that we confront both in the EVA adopter sample and the control firm sample is that of firms that de-
list within the event period. Delisting can result from acquisition, bankruptcy or going private. Liu & Strong (2006) replace de-
listed firm returns by either zero or the risk-free rate. They find similar results in both cases. Lyon, Barber & Tsai (1999) and 
Mitchell & Stafford (2000, p.298) replace all de-listed firms with the benchmark return. This has the potential to create an 
upward bias in the estimated BHAR returns, since some of these de-listings are bankruptcies. However, for the purpose of our 
study we use the following rules. If an observation is missing within a valid set of observations, we set the return equal to zero. 
If the de-listings are due to bankruptcy, we replace the missing return by -1. Finally, if the delisting is due to a value preserving 
event such as a merger, we replace the return by the benchmark return. We use CRSP description as a distinguishing feature of 
the delisted firms. The Delisting Code is a 3-digit integer code. It either (1) indicates that a security is still trading or (2) provides 
a specific reason for delisting.  All coded de-listings are categorized by the first digit of the delisting code. The second and third 
digits of the delisting codes provide further details of delisting events. Additional delisting codes, specific to various delisting 
categories, have been created to indicate when an issue is closed to further research, or if the issue is pending further research. 
The most important codes are 241, 231, 233, 331, 251, 552 and 574. These categories of delisting are most likely to be stocks 
that are either worthless or some distance from providing shareholders with any terminal value, and consequently we treat these 
cases as if investors lost all their investment.  
5. Results 
 
5.1 Cumulative Abnormal Return Results 
We begin by discussing cumulative abnormal returns. All results are displayed as follows. The average CAR, the standard t-
statistics, the skewness adjusted t-statistic with its bootstrapped confidence intervals, the skewness and kurtosis of each set of 
cumulative abnormal returns is shown for selected months. The statistics are shown in a brief table that shows the 1st, 10th, 20th 
and up to the 60th month. Whenever the standard t-statistic is above 1.96, the results are also shown. The full 60 months’ version 
of the table is provided in the appendix. To complete the picture, we provide a graphic summary of CAR, the skewness adjusted 
t-statistic and the 1% and 99% quantiles obtained from the wild bootstrap. Table 2 reveals an interesting story about the overall 
performance, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the 10 years after the adoption date. Throughout the 5-year post-event 
period, most of the CARs appear to be positive but insignificant except for the months 27, 28, 29 and 30 which are in the third 
year after EVA adoption. During these months the mean CARs are at their highest levels and are significant. However, following 
these months, we find that CARs start to decline and then rebound up again around month 40. After that we see that CARs 
decrease and fall into negative territories. Especially in the last 4 months in year 5 this negative trend is quite visible indicating 
that EVA adopters underperform their matched non-EVA firms. Figure 1 depicts AR against CAR based on matching firms’ 
benchmarking. 
 
Table 2 
Matching Firm Based Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
Month N Mean t-stat Adj-SK-t F1-1%b F1-99%b Skewness Kurtosis 
1 87 0.024 1.599 1.719 -2.562 2.358 1.104 3.605 
10 87 -0.005 -0.145 -0.151 -2.26 2.423 -0.289 0.600 
20 87 0.079 1.454 1.521 -2.601 2.327 0.721 2.139 
27 87 0.146 2.157 2.365 -2.568 2.653 1.126 4.581 
28 87 0.147 2.070 2.315 -2.863 2.661 1.433 8.619 
29 87 0.152 2.104 2.360 -2.831 2.758 1.451 8.893 
30 87 0.140 1.984 2.192 -2.562 2.563 1.312 7.815 
40 87 0.122 1.424 1.467 -2.579 2.536 0.473 3.991 
50 85 -0.017 -0.140 -0.136 -2.332 2.452 0.233 3.597 
60 82 -0.032 -0.245 -0.254 -2.404 2.480 -0.424 2.574 
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Fig. 1. Average CAR results based on Matching Firm Abnormal Returns 
Table 3 shows CARs based on market benchmarks (S&P 500), In nearly all months, adopter firms outperform the market with 
small variances which does not increase in the best of cases more than 8.5% at month 20 and this is the only significant month 
of the 5 year post-event period. The mean return based on CAR is positive for most months except for months 34, 35 and 36, 
which give negative CAR. All the CAR returns are skewed and leptokurtic, this might be attributed to the compounding process 
inherited in CAR calculations. However, the simple CAR based on matching firms and market benchmarking shows similar 
dynamics- the scale of the suggested outperformance is not the same. Firstly, the CAR based on matching firms is about twice 
as large as the CAR based on the market benchmark in the positive cases. Secondly, CAR based on benchmarking is only 
negative between months 34 and 36. This is followed by an apparent upward trend (Figure 2). 
Table 3  
Market Benchmark Based Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Month N Mean t-stat Adj-SK-t F1-1%b F1-99%b Skewness Kurtosis 
1 87 0.003 0.222 0.229 -2.519 2.456 0.356 1.531 
10 87 0.013 0.479 0.507 -2.711 2.445 1.097 2.635 
20 87 0.085 1.848 2.091 -2.477 2.551 1.737 5.677 
30 87 0.066 0.929 1.004 -2.404 2.59 1.535 5.988 
40 87 0.020 0.252 0.279 -2.632 2.659 1.336 3.738 
50 85 0.029 0.262 0.289 -2.346 2.313 1.295 3.024 
60 82 0.013 0.108 0.119 -2.604 2.396 0.598 2.310 
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56
Sk-adj-t 1% quantile 99% quantile
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56
CAR
 694
 
Fig. 2. Average CAR Results Based on Market Index Abnormal Returns 
5.2 Buy and Hold Return Results 
Our first results regarding the BHAR, presented in Table 4, show the BHAR derived using firm benchmark. The BHAR 
increases from an insignificant +1.0% after 9 months to a significant 36.4% after 27 months, becoming insignificant thereafter 
and continuing to increase to 37.4% after 41 months, 40.2% after 45 months, and then starts to decline to reach the lowest return 
of 4.3% after 59 months. All returns are skewed and leptokurtic. It is worth noting that the adopter’s buy and hold return (BHAR) 
itself is highly skewed and leptokurtic throughout the period and that the matching firm is also skewed and leptokurtic, but to a 
lesser extent. 
Table 4  
Summary Statistic for BHAR Matching firms 
Month N Mean t-stat Adjusted Sk. t-stat 
1% bootstrap  
quantile 
99% bootstrap 
quantile Skewness Kurtosis 
1 87 0.024 1.599 1.719 -2.487 2.533 1.104 3.605 
10 87 0.014 0.335 0.342 -2.415 2.25 0.308 2.038 
20 87 0.152 1.689 2.056 -2.587 2.666 3.060 16.422 
26 87 0.211 2.006 2.29 -2.636 2.508 1.761 7.079 
27 87 0.364 2.234 3.031 -2.914 2.949 4.066 22.522 
30 87 0.373 1.867 2.725 -2.892 2.687 6.027 46.440 
40 87 0.337 1.842 2.474 -2.982 2.724 4.539 31.268 
50 85 0.277 0.916 0.987 -2.743 2.729 1.471 17.361 
60 82 0.114 0.406 0.318 -2.809 2.807 -3.598 25.216 
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Fig. 3. Average BHAR Results Based on Matching Firm Abnormal Returns 
 Table 5 presents the results from a comparison with the benchmarking portfolio.  Generally, the BHARs are smaller in value 
than those obtained with matching firms’ benchmarks. Once again the BHAR has a positive and insignificant mean return 
through the hold period, it is positive at month one (3%), rising to the highest and insignificant mean return of 20.6% after 29 
months, three years and one  month after the event date. Beyond 29 months the rate of decline accelerates, with abnormal returns 
reaching 18.4% after 4 years and -2.7% after 5 years. The skewness and kurtosis of the BHAR based on matching firms is 
greater than under the benchmark S&P500. The difference being attributable to the new issue and rebalancing issue in the 
benchmark portfolio compared to the matching firm benchmark.                     
 Table 5 
Summary Statistic for BHAR Using the Market Portfolio as a Benchmark 
Month N Mean t-stat Adj-SK-t F1-1%b F1-99%b Skewness Kurtosis 
1 87 0.003 0.222 0.229 -2.517 2.314 0.356 1.531 
10 87 0.014 0.395 0.439 -2.530 2.634 1.883 5.973 
20 87 0.140 1.476 1.916 -2.753 3.025 4.597 27.909 
30 87 0.206 1.023 1.344 -3.168 2.850 5.815 41.726 
40 87 0.027 0.147 0.232 -2.537 2.855 4.570 28.741 
50 85 0.193 0.752 0.892 -2.866 2.908 3.635 18.299 
60 82 -0.027 -0.143 -0.117 -2.769 2.307 1.361 1.634 
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Fig. 4. Average BHAR Results Based on Market Index Abnormal Returns 
There is a quite obvious difference between BHAR and CAR. CARs look more stable than BHAR when using matching firms 
to calculate the abnormality. On the other hand, the results based on the market benchmark are essentially the same and the 
produced curves are identical in most time periods. Even within BHAR itself. BHAR calculated using a matching firm appears 
greater than when using the benchmark market portfolio (S&P500). Overall, the behaviour of the aggregate abnormal return, 
CAR and BHAR, clearly appear to be sensitive to the method adopted to gauge the abnormality. Furthermore, BHAR based on 
matching firms grow faster than when based on the S&P500 benchmark especially after the adoption date where BHAR 
increased by more than 1.5 times. As discussed in the previous section the aggregate abnormal return, BHAR and CAR, is 
always highly skewed and leptokurtic and we suggest the wild bootstrapping (as discussed in methodology section) as a 
correction for these biases. This section will highlight the results of the bootstrap and the result of testing the null hypothesis 
that the aggregate abnormal returns, CAR and BHAR, are zero. The full version of the bootstrap test and tables are provided in 
Appendix (2). Fig. 3 depicts the skewness-adjusted t-statistic for the holding periods (60 months). The dotted and dashed lines 
are the 5th and 95th percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution. These can be interpreted at either the 5% critical value level for 
a one tail test, or the 10% critical value for a two-tail test.  The graphs describe the two schemes of benchmarking: S&P500 
portfolio and matching firms have a similar pattern but express different messages.  The two graphs have the same feature which 
is that outperformance increases at around month 13 but there is then a slight variation with a different and insignificant range. 
For the BHAR-based market benchmark portfolio scheme the insignificancy remains hold throughout the holding period and 
the outperformance accelerates to reach the highest volume in month 20. Following this it is slightly volatile and reaches the 
lowest point of outperformance in month 39 after which it dramatically increases until month 45 where it then appears stable to 
the end of the holding period. Similarly, the BHAR based on matching firms copies its counterpart but the outperformance 
ceases from being significant at around the 25 – 31 month and 37- 42 month period. However, the aggregate BH return rapidly 
decreases after month 47 to reach close to zero as shown in Figure 4. 
The CAR based on the matching benchmark provides a different story: the graph in Figure 4 shows that CAR behaviour becomes 
more erratic and is no longer significant beginning from around the period 25-31 months. The performance of the adopting firms 
is quite low, almost zero after the adoption date and sometimes underperforms the matching firms as depicted in Fig. 4. 
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5.3. Discussion 
In general, the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the adoption of EVA as a compensation and management plan 
will positively affect the performance of adopting companies. The paper compares the performance of adopting firms to that of 
selected matching firms and to the market indexes particularly the S&P500 portfolio. Then it uses two common aggregating 
methods to test the event of adopting EVA by different US firms namely the CAR and BHAR methods. The results obtained 
however, showed a slight improvement in the performance of companies adopting EVA within five years from the date of 
adoption. This is implicitly in line with what Wallace (1997) concludes in this regard. Wallace indicated that adopting EVA will 
encourage managers to take decisions that will lead to efficiently using the firm’s assets to increase the wealth of shareholders 
and the value of firms through taking accurate decisions regarding the investing, financing and operating activities. This, in turn, 
will be reflected in the price of shares in the stock market, therefore improving the performances of these stocks. 
Similarly, the results achieved is incompatible with that of Kleiman (1999) where he compares the performance of firms 
adopting EVA to the performance two set of matching firms, the industry peer and closest match peer. By comparing the median 
of abnormal return he found that EVA adopter’s show better performance after the adoption and outperform both the industry 
peer and closest peer match firms. The adjusted market return increases from 2.8% to 28.8% through three year time period 
after the adoption for the industry peer and from 2.6% to 7.8% for the closest match peer. However, the increases in performance 
of the adopting firms are still quite low. I used the mean of CAR and BHAR to compare the performances of adopting firms to 
those matching firms and market benchmark portfolio (S&P500 index) and the result revealed that EVA’s firms outperform 
those matching and S&P500 portfolio and the CAR increases to reach 8.85% and 36.6% for matching firms and benchmark 
index respectively and the BHAR increases to 6.6% and 26.8% for the same order.  
6. Conclusion  
This paper has described the research design and the methodology that was used to examine the EVA adoption event. Both the 
CAR and the BHAR approaches were adopted to conduct our study. The previous research has been extended by increasing the 
number of EVA adopter firms to 89 and the time horizon of the study to cover the firms’ performance during the period 1960-
2012 was also extended. In addition, wild bootstrapping and using the skewness adjusted t-statistic to enhance the statistical 
reliability of the event test statistics was adopted. By doing this all three moments of the parent distribution of the test statistic 
(heteroscedasticity, skewness and kurtosis) were taken into account. Furthermore, the criterion to select the matching firms was 
carefully applied as was the problem of delisting.  
The results obtained in this research are consistent with the previous studies’ results discussed in section 5.2. Regardless of the 
methodology approach, CAR or BHAR, the results of this chapter reveal that firms adopting EVA as a compensation plan and 
management tool outperform the market (S&P500) and matching firms (same sector) most of the time within the hold period.  
The CAR results show that despite the benchmarking used the majority of adopter firms positively outperform the matching 
firms and the S&P500 portfolio and for a few months the adopter firms have a negative performance mainly in year one and 
year five of the 10 year estimated period. In general, CAR appears more stable and has the lowest skewed and leptokurtic. 
Regarding the BHAR approach the findings reveal that the mean return of the adopter firms is both positive and highly skewed 
and leptokurtic throughout the holding period. Generally, the results obtained from a comparison against the benchmarking 
portfolio (S&P500) are smaller in value than those obtained when compared to the matching firms’ benchmark. One interesting 
finding is that CAR is almost the same as BHAR when the S&P500 portfolio is used as a benchmark to calculate the aggregate 
returns. 
To sum up, irrespective of the aggregation approach used to measure the abnormal return, the adopter firms have a considerably 
low outperformance and this outperformance increased as the hold period increased. However, even with the positive 
performances most EVA adopter firms’ outperformance declines after the adoption and takes some time to return to negative 
performance when matching benchmarks are used. This might typically reflect the fact that the market might react poorly to the 
adoption announcement. Finally, by analysing the adopter firms’ performance we recognize that the adoption exists after a 
period of bad performances. 
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix 1  
EVA Adopting Companies 1987-2001(USA) and Control Companies 
NO. SAMPLE COMPANY ADOPTION YEAR CONTROL COMPANY SIC CODE 
1 COCA COLA 1987 PEPSICO INC 2080 
2 CSX CORPORATION 1988 SANTA FE FINANCIAL CORP 6711 
3 CILCORP 1989 ALLETE INC 4931 
4 CRANE CO 1990 WHITTAKER CORP 3490/3494 
5 BRIGGS & STRATTON 1990 STEWART & STEVENSON SVCS INC 3510/3519 
6 QUAKER OATS 1991 RALSTON PURINA CO 2040/2043 
7 BALL CORP 1992 CROWN HOLDINGS INC 3221 
8 WHIRLPOOL CORP 1992 AKTIEBOLAGET ELECTROLUX 3630 
9 AT&T 1992 G T E CORP 4813 
10 SCHERER, R.P. 1992 FOREST LABS INC 2834 
11 WELLMAN 1993 ASHLAND INC NEW 2824 
12 GRAINGER, W.W. 1993 WAXMAN INDUSTRIES INC 5063 
13 MANITOWOC CO 1993 ASTEC INDUSTRIES INC 3531 
14 DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP 1993 APPLE INC 3573 
15 FURON CORP. 1993 WYNNS INTERNATIONAL INC 3079 
16 HARNISCHFEGER IND. INC.  1993 APPLIED MATERIALS INC 3536 
17 HEWLETT PACKARD CO. 1993 HITACHI LIMITED 3571 
18 RUBY TUESDAY INC.  1993 WORLDWIDE RESTAURANT CNCPTS INC 5812 
19 SMITH INTERNATIONAL INC.  1993 CABOT CORP 3533 
20 TRANSAMERICA CORP 1993 LOEWS CORP 6711 
21 ACXIOM CORP 1994 MCGRAW HILL COS INC 7370 
22 BOISE CASCADE CORP 1994 BT OFFICE PRODUCTS INTL INC 2421 
23 FLEMING COMPANIES INC 1994 NASH FINCH COMPANY 5141 
24 GEORGIAPACIFIC GROUP 1994 WEYERHAEUSER CO 2435 
25 LILLY (ELI) & CO 1994 WYETH 2834 
26 SPRINT FON GROUP 1994 CENTEL CORP 4813 
27 CENTURA BANKS INC 1994 AMERICAN FLETCHER CORP 6036 
28 CORE INDUSTRIES INC.  1994 WHITTAKER CORP 3429 
29 DEERE & CO.  1994 KUBOTA CORP 3523 
30 EASTMAN CHEMICAL CO.  1994 ROHM & HAAS CO 3861 
31 GENCORP INC. 1994 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 3011 
32 INCSTAR CORP. 1994 A M A G PHARMACEUTICALS INC 2830 
33 INSTEEL INDUSTRIES 1994 NATIONAL STANDARD CO 3310 
34 OHIO EDISON CO. 1994 NORTHEAST UTILITIES 4911 
35 REYNOLDS METALS CO.  1994 KAISERTECH LTD 3353 
36 TENNECO INC.  1994 CHAMPION PARTS INC 3714 
37 WALLACE COMPUTER SERVICES  1994 MOORE WALLACE INC 2761 
38 ZOLTEK COS. INC.  1994 WOODWARD INC 3620 
39 ARMSTRONG HOLDINGS INC 1995 NEWELL RUBBERMAID INC 2511 
40 BARD (C.R.) 1995 TELEFLEX INC 5086 
41 PERKINELMER INC 1995 BIO RAD LABORATORIES INC 3823 
42 SPX CORP 1995 GIDDINGS & LEWIS INC WIS 3540 
43 AMERICAN PRECISION IND.  1995 FRANKLIN ELECTRIC INC 3443 
44 ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES 1995 E G & G INC (VISKASE COMPANIES) 2511 
45 BECKMAN INSTRUMENTS INC. 1995 PERKINELMER INC 5311 
46 EMERSON ELECTRIC CO.  1995 PANASONIC CORP 3621/3823 
47 IPALCO ENTERPRISES INC.  1995 TUCSON /U N S ENERGY CORP 4911 
48 KAISER ALLUMINUM CORP.  1995 MAXXAM INC 3334 
49 KNIGHT–RIDDER INC. 1995 NEW YORK TIMES CO 2711 
50 NEW JERSEY RESOURCES  1995 ATMOS ENERGY CORP 4924 
51 SEQUENT COMPUTER  1995 STRATUS COMPUTER INC 3570 
52 ADC TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC 1996 TELLABS INC 3679 
53 BAUSCH & LOMB INC 1996 CHIRON CORP 3861 
54 BECTON DICKINSON & CO 1996 BARD C R INC 3841 
55 DONNELLEY (R R) & SONS CO 1996 BOWNE & CO INC 3229 
56 GUIDANT CORP 1996 MEDTRONIC INC 3841 
57 KANSAS CITY POWER & LIGHT 1996 C M P GROUP INC 4911 
58 OLIN CORP 1996 F M C CORP 2810 
59 SILICON VY BANCSHARES 1996 AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION 6022/6710 
60 TUPPERWARE CORP 1996 ENVIRODYNE INDUSTRIES INC 3089 
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Appendix 1. Continued. 
NO. SAMPLE COMPANY ADOPTION YEAR CONTROL COMPANY SIC CODE 
61  MILLER HERMAN 1996 H N I CORP 2531 
62 CINCINNATI MILACRON  1996 KENNAMETAL INC 3541 
63 HACH CO.  1996 COHERENT INC 3820 
64 KLLM TRANSPORT SERVICES 1996 MATLACK SYSTEMS INC 4210 
65 NEW ENGLAND BUSINESS SERVICES 1996 ENNIS INC 2761 
66 QUAKER STATE  1996 TESORO CORP 2911 
67 STRATTEC SECURITY CORP  1996 F M C CORP 8740 
68 TEKTRONIX 1996 SNAP ON INC 3825 
69 CDI CORP  1997 ROBERT HALF INTL INC 3269 
70 GC COMPANIES INC 1997 MARCUS CORP 7830 
71 JOHNSON OUTDOORS INC   1997 ELECTRO SCIENTIFIC INDS INC 3940 
72 MILLENNIUM CHEMICALS INC 1997 BIG THREE INDS INC 2813 
73 PHARMACIA CORP 1997 BAUSCH & LOMB INC 2823 
74 RYDER SYSTEM INC 1997 ROLLINS TRUCK LEASING CORP 6159 
75 TENET HEALTHCARE CORP 1997 UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES INC 8062 
76 WEBSTER FINL CRP WATERBURY 1997 AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION 6035 
77 FEDERALMOGUL CORP 1998 DANA HOLDING CORP 3562 
78 MATERIAL SCIENCES CORP 1998 SHAW GROUP INC 3470 
79 MONTANA POWER CO 1998 C H ENERGY GROUP INC 4911 
80 PENNEY (J C) CO 1998 DILLARDS INC 5311 
81 STANDARD MOTOR PRODS 1998 HARBINGER GROUP INC 3694 
82 BRADLEY PHARMACEUTICALS 1998 BALCHEM CORP 2830/5120 
83 BEST BUY CO INC 1998 RADIOSHACK CORP 5732 
84 INTERNATIONAL MULTIFOODS  1999 RALSTON PURINA CO 2041 
85 TOYS R US INC 1999 MICHAELS STORES INC 6711 
86 GENESCO 1999 FOOT LOCKER INC 2341 
87 MOLSON COORS 1999 ANHEUSER BUSCH COS INC 2082 
88 SCHNITZER STEEL 2000 ENVIROSOURCE INC 3310 
89 HARSCO 2001 DYNAMIC MATERIALS CORP 3446 
 
Source: Wallace, 1997 and Kleiman (1999), Stern Stewart & Co. brochure, Lexis-Nexis, Proxy Statement and 10-Q report and 
Wall Street Journal. 
  
A. Al Shishany et al. /Accounting 6 (2020) 701
Appendix 2: Full version of the bootstrap  
Table A2  
Matching firm based cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
Month N Mean t-stat Adj-SK-t F1-1%b F1-99%b Skewness Kurtosis 
1 87 0.024 1.599 1.719 -2.562 2.358 1.104 3.605 
2 87 0.028 1.160 1.163 -2.549 2.73 0.037 7.417 
3 87 0.021 0.801 0.83 -2.381 2.422 0.711 2.073 
4 87 0.025 0.881 0.908 -2.552 2.442 0.588 2.004 
5 87 0.044 1.452 1.481 -2.294 2.4 0.310 0.567 
6 87 0.038 1.284 1.298 -2.335 2.427 0.180 1.042 
7 87 0.009 0.276 0.28 -2.462 2.423 0.206 1.239 
8 87 -0.006 -0.183 -0.187 -2.427 2.419 -0.209 0.337 
9 87 -0.006 -0.180 -0.186 -2.394 2.351 -0.311 0.146 
10 87 -0.005 -0.145 -0.151 -2.26 2.423 -0.289 0.600 
11 87 0.022 0.595 0.596 -2.512 2.406 0.018 0.958 
12 87 0.016 0.388 0.38 -2.536 2.497 -0.336 1.909 
13 87 0.003 0.070 0.068 -2.267 2.146 -0.158 2.011 
14 87 0.046 1.058 1.068 -2.313 2.68 0.162 1.116 
15 87 0.069 1.526 1.543 -2.594 2.268 0.166 1.275 
16 87 0.059 1.303 1.326 -2.258 2.516 0.302 0.577 
17 87 0.065 1.429 1.439 -2.495 2.688 0.108 0.587 
18 87 0.075 1.502 1.543 -2.613 2.398 0.416 1.457 
19 87 0.072 1.319 1.387 -2.396 2.638 0.848 2.319 
20 87 0.079 1.454 1.521 -2.601 2.327 0.721 2.139 
21 87 0.033 0.674 0.683 -2.514 2.29 0.273 1.144 
22 87 0.026 0.527 0.526 -2.433 2.224 -0.023 0.814 
23 87 0.052 1.044 1.037 -2.47 2.695 -0.122 0.341 
24 87 0.040 0.754 0.757 -2.285 2.224 0.073 0.754 
25 87 0.071 1.272 1.302 -2.229 2.437 0.394 1.352 
26 87 0.101 1.708 1.768 -2.429 2.352 0.494 1.298 
27 87 0.146 2.157 2.365 -2.568 2.653 1.126 4.581 
28 87 0.147 2.070 2.315 -2.863 2.661 1.433 8.619 
29 87 0.152 2.104 2.360 -2.831 2.758 1.451 8.893 
30 87 0.140 1.984 2.192 -2.562 2.563 1.312 7.815 
31 87 0.108 1.480 1.533 -2.563 2.655 0.548 5.698 
32 87 0.061 0.819 0.865 -2.710 2.368 1.105 7.834 
33 87 0.043 0.541 0.572 -2.679 2.708 1.089 8.359 
34 87 0.026 0.312 0.329 -2.519 2.475 0.774 6.823 
35 87 0.024 0.279 0.291 -2.527 2.569 0.587 7.305 
36 87 0.030 0.343 0.354 -2.435 2.52 0.532 6.817 
37 87 0.071 0.847 0.879 -2.742 2.654 0.757 5.666 
38 87 0.084 1.022 1.049 -2.437 2.656 0.488 4.295 
39 87 0.098 1.173 1.198 -2.509 2.391 0.364 4.015 
40 87 0.122 1.424 1.467 -2.579 2.536 0.473 3.991 
41 87 0.150 1.757 1.843 -2.551 2.421 0.674 4.038 
42 86 0.080 0.821 0.838 -2.309 2.443 0.401 4.149 
43 86 0.060 0.585 0.598 -2.331 2.429 0.425 3.237 
44 86 0.033 0.314 0.326 -2.635 2.254 0.553 3.481 
45 86 0.020 0.171 0.178 -2.813 2.572 0.378 4.421 
46 85 0.014 0.116 0.118 -2.546 2.634 0.104 4.501 
47 85 0.033 0.280 0.285 -2.207 2.419 0.280 3.228 
48 85 0.015 0.119 0.119 -2.515 2.662 -0.023 3.568 
49 85 -0.003 -0.026 -0.024 -2.657 2.336 0.117 3.556 
50 85 -0.017 -0.140 -0.136 -2.332 2.452 0.233 3.597 
51 85 -0.025 -0.200 -0.196 -2.329 2.409 0.181 3.441 
52 85 0.053 0.420 0.421 -2.468 2.643 0.049 3.528 
53 85 0.077 0.626 0.629 -2.597 2.63 0.103 3.763 
54 85 0.088 0.718 0.711 -2.436 2.322 -0.174 3.531 
55 84 0.052 0.408 0.401 -2.351 2.690 -0.301 3.115 
56 84 0.004 0.033 0.022 -2.319 2.430 -0.593 3.500 
57 84 -0.003 -0.022 -0.03 -2.657 2.293 -0.424 2.862 
58 83 -0.037 -0.275 -0.285 -2.470 2.363 -0.476 3.240 
59 82 -0.035 -0.262 -0.272 -2.493 2.821 -0.465 3.126 
60 82 -0.032 -0.245 -0.254 -2.404 2.480 -0.424 2.574 
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Table A3. Market Benchmark Based Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Month N Mean t-stat Adj-SK-t F1-1%b F1-99%b Skewness Kurtosis 
1 87 0.003 0.222 0.229 -2.519 2.456 0.356 1.531 
2 87 0.011 0.852 0.891 -2.465 2.211 0.885 2.127 
3 87 0.003 0.219 0.23 -2.415 2.609 0.545 2.396 
4 87 0.016 0.871 0.898 -2.363 2.343 0.584 3.135 
5 87 0.014 0.664 0.687 -2.454 2.762 0.698 4.973 
6 87 0.014 0.663 0.697 -2.665 2.773 1.015 5.989 
7 87 0.014 0.580 0.616 -2.741 2.451 1.214 5.324 
8 87 0.026 0.984 1.027 -2.365 2.5 0.807 2.016 
9 87 0.026 0.993 1.054 -2.506 2.589 1.160 2.549 
10 87 0.013 0.479 0.507 -2.711 2.445 1.097 2.635 
11 87 0.020 0.718 0.766 -2.606 2.383 1.323 3.711 
12 87 0.024 0.785 0.816 -2.269 2.367 0.771 2.318 
13 87 0.000 -0.014 0.008 -2.567 2.649 1.233 6.009 
14 87 0.024 0.682 0.722 -2.447 2.546 1.152 5.598 
15 87 0.040 1.059 1.13 -2.442 2.761 1.230 5.891 
16 87 0.038 1.062 1.159 -2.467 2.508 1.666 5.495 
17 87 0.043 1.128 1.227 -2.662 2.579 1.560 4.264 
18 87 0.054 1.246 1.388 -2.483 2.542 1.935 6.541 
19 87 0.062 1.324 1.478 -2.439 2.676 1.908 6.382 
20 87 0.085 1.848 2.091 -2.477 2.551 1.737 5.677 
21 87 0.063 1.332 1.447 -2.441 2.589 1.421 3.920 
22 87 0.041 0.832 0.875 -2.435 2.491 1.003 2.496 
23 87 0.060 1.217 1.292 -2.666 2.491 1.051 3.104 
24 87 0.046 0.858 0.89 -2.397 2.356 0.719 1.912 
25 87 0.054 0.979 1.017 -2.417 2.545 0.741 1.901 
26 87 0.067 1.134 1.178 -2.67 2.378 0.696 2.080 
27 87 0.085 1.253 1.348 -2.728 2.685 1.281 4.510 
28 87 0.077 1.088 1.192 -2.97 2.619 1.732 7.175 
29 87 0.081 1.145 1.261 -2.761 2.668 1.793 7.532 
30 87 0.066 0.929 1.004 -2.404 2.59 1.535 5.988 
31 87 0.050 0.722 0.775 -2.453 2.657 1.456 5.323 
32 87 0.047 0.661 0.711 -2.597 2.836 1.488 6.305 
33 87 0.013 0.175 0.2 -2.639 2.463 1.347 6.595 
34 87 -0.002 -0.024 -0.009 -2.878 2.454 0.880 5.305 
35 87 -0.003 -0.035 -0.024 -2.321 2.489 0.626 6.095 
36 87 -0.003 -0.037 -0.023 -2.401 2.659 0.800 5.023 
37 87 0.023 0.296 0.325 -2.469 2.772 1.407 4.560 
38 87 0.019 0.244 0.266 -2.598 2.464 1.123 3.300 
39 87 0.014 0.178 0.196 -2.334 2.582 0.994 3.021 
40 87 0.020 0.252 0.279 -2.632 2.659 1.336 3.738 
41 87 0.051 0.643 0.685 -2.483 2.639 1.305 3.550 
42 86 0.040 0.451 0.482 -2.671 2.444 1.243 3.686 
43 86 0.036 0.392 0.419 -2.517 2.448 1.109 3.625 
44 86 0.046 0.487 0.517 -2.278 2.736 1.126 3.882 
45 86 0.042 0.426 0.45 -2.656 2.626 0.975 4.307 
46 85 0.023 0.215 0.233 -2.459 2.444 0.941 3.907 
47 85 0.044 0.404 0.433 -2.571 2.881 1.182 3.816 
48 85 0.036 0.322 0.348 -2.181 2.575 1.188 3.480 
49 85 0.024 0.218 0.246 -2.691 2.329 1.390 3.665 
50 85 0.029 0.262 0.289 -2.346 2.313 1.295 3.024 
51 85 0.007 0.063 0.084 -2.421 2.582 1.146 2.415 
52 85 0.044 0.398 0.425 -2.402 2.495 1.147 2.863 
53 85 0.065 0.610 0.651 -2.63 2.254 1.294 2.955 
54 85 0.066 0.603 0.64 -2.404 2.668 1.207 2.439 
55 84 0.065 0.577 0.607 -2.385 2.653 0.985 1.989 
56 84 0.059 0.521 0.54 -2.402 2.586 0.657 1.688 
57 84 0.062 0.544 0.564 -2.691 2.268 0.703 1.587 
58 83 0.015 0.125 0.134 -2.451 2.372 0.432 2.448 
59 82 0.028 0.238 0.253 -2.536 2.369 0.722 2.495 
60 82 0.013 0.108 0.119 -2.604 2.396 0.598 2.310 
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Table A4  
Summary Statistic for BHAR Matching firms  
Month N Mean t-stat Adjusted Sk. t-stat 
1% bootstrap  
quantile 
99% bootstrap 
quantile Skewness Kurtosis 
1 87 0.024 1.599 1.719 -2.487 2.533 1.104 3.605 
2 87 0.027 1.132 1.123 -2.59 2.721 -0.132 7.044 
3 87 0.023 0.918 0.954 -2.262 2.356 0.753 1.094 
4 87 0.025 0.872 0.881 -2.242 2.389 0.207 0.943 
5 87 0.051 1.658 1.667 -2.327 2.35 0.085 0.199 
6 87 0.050 1.599 1.625 -2.348 2.247 0.237 0.988 
7 87 0.018 0.535 0.544 -2.382 2.702 0.335 1.485 
8 87 0.015 0.427 0.432 -2.404 2.515 0.192 1.120 
9 87 0.010 0.292 0.288 -2.559 2.359 -0.153 1.033 
10 87 0.014 0.335 0.342 -2.415 2.25 0.308 2.038 
11 87 0.044 0.979 1.036 -2.741 2.656 1.098 5.016 
12 87 0.036 0.703 0.728 -2.566 2.714 0.718 5.566 
13 87 0.031 0.512 0.577 -2.736 2.814 2.356 16.800 
14 87 0.085 1.398 1.624 -2.804 2.901 2.580 15.777 
15 87 0.117 1.746 2.085 -2.976 2.853 2.668 16.099 
16 87 0.089 1.367 1.518 -2.838 2.696 1.786 8.584 
17 87 0.106 1.670 1.793 -2.486 2.669 1.048 4.907 
18 87 0.140 1.690 2.025 -2.768 2.793 2.789 15.563 
19 87 0.148 1.578 1.935 -2.753 2.567 3.344 17.974 
20 87 0.152 1.689 2.056 -2.587 2.666 3.060 16.422 
21 87 0.109 1.357 1.53 -2.656 2.547 2.059 9.584 
22 87 0.089 1.254 1.342 -2.482 2.754 1.189 4.315 
23 87 0.130 1.735 1.837 -2.639 2.635 0.808 2.349 
24 87 0.124 1.501 1.599 -2.551 2.486 1.003 2.920 
25 87 0.161 1.732 1.934 -2.801 2.63 1.614 6.448 
26 87 0.211 2.006 2.29 -2.636 2.508 1.761 7.079 
27 87 0.364 2.234 3.031 -2.914 2.949 4.066 22.522 
28 87 0.413 1.851 2.743 -2.792 2.85 6.363 49.871 
29 87 0.425 1.780 2.679 -2.666 2.7 6.859 56.352 
30 87 0.373 1.867 2.725 -2.892 2.687 6.027 46.440 
31 87 0.255 1.598 2.008 -2.912 2.648 3.760 23.568 
32 87 0.203 1.078 1.418 -2.876 2.846 5.716 44.580 
33 87 0.211 0.954 1.274 -2.841 2.609 6.345 51.760 
34 87 0.155 0.840 1.054 -2.807 2.775 4.982 38.066 
35 87 0.166 0.772 0.997 -2.638 2.688 5.757 46.431 
36 87 0.220 1.000 1.3 -3.091 2.877 5.611 44.399 
37 87 0.272 1.229 1.661 -2.861 2.712 6.014 47.760 
38 87 0.252 1.514 1.935 -2.991 2.97 4.220 28.896 
39 87 0.282 1.729 2.245 -2.751 2.686 4.136 27.962 
40 87 0.337 1.842 2.474 -2.982 2.724 4.539 31.268 
41 87 0.374 1.945 2.706 -2.596 2.848 4.971 36.013 
42 86 0.345 1.473 2.002 -2.818 2.707 5.518 41.645 
43 86 0.338 1.484 1.976 -2.82 2.763 5.065 36.029 
44 86 0.344 1.284 1.764 -2.888 2.58 6.204 49.114 
45 86 0.402 1.100 1.547 -2.577 2.698 7.274 62.522 
46 85 0.333 1.067 1.321 -2.911 2.572 4.291 37.375 
47 85 0.397 1.492 1.851 -3.016 2.664 3.643 23.407 
48 85 0.320 1.129 1.136 -2.666 2.982 0.104 13.804 
49 85 0.278 0.977 1.048 -3.003 2.921 1.347 14.872 
50 85 0.277 0.916 0.987 -2.743 2.729 1.471 17.361 
51 85 0.260 0.889 0.954 -2.806 3.187 1.397 17.202 
52 85 0.350 1.154 1.196 -2.629 2.674 0.637 16.466 
53 85 0.362 1.297 1.331 -2.708 2.905 0.425 14.558 
54 85 0.366 1.313 1.165 -2.587 2.84 -1.841 16.042 
55 84 0.277 0.891 0.735 -2.683 3.122 -3.316 24.924 
56 84 0.140 0.389 0.274 -2.531 2.905 -4.878 38.610 
57 84 0.205 0.633 0.509 -2.978 2.931 -3.793 29.151 
58 83 0.113 0.327 0.225 -2.839 3.053 -4.590 35.622 
59 82 0.043 0.120 0.022 -2.81 3.091 -5.210 40.325 
60 82 0.114 0.406 0.318 -2.809 2.807 -3.598 25.216 
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Table A5  
Summary Statistic for BHAR Using the Market Portfolio as a Benchmark 
Month N Mean t-stat Adj-SK-t F1-1%b F1-99%b Skewness Kurtosis 
1 87 0.003 0.222 0.229 -2.517 2.314 0.356 1.531 
2 87 0.010 0.731 0.773 -2.443 2.509 1.129 3.344 
3 87 0.002 0.125 0.146 -2.616 2.364 1.114 4.430 
4 87 0.015 0.735 0.786 -2.471 2.687 1.356 5.424 
5 87 0.016 0.645 0.713 -2.497 2.790 2.057 11.638 
6 87 0.015 0.561 0.637 -2.871 2.758 2.615 14.408 
7 87 0.013 0.446 0.503 -2.754 2.780 2.314 9.919 
8 87 0.028 0.891 0.952 -2.875 2.266 1.332 3.516 
9 87 0.021 0.683 0.741 -2.629 2.594 1.682 4.889 
10 87 0.014 0.395 0.439 -2.530 2.634 1.883 5.973 
11 87 0.019 0.492 0.558 -2.810 2.568 2.488 10.560 
12 87 0.025 0.633 0.701 -2.758 2.546 2.128 9.543 
13 87 0.005 0.092 0.174 -2.815 2.738 4.492 31.865 
14 87 0.034 0.608 0.739 -2.768 2.741 4.198 28.362 
15 87 0.058 0.906 1.118 -2.995 2.708 4.513 30.711 
16 87 0.043 0.704 0.843 -2.721 3.068 3.898 22.625 
17 87 0.049 0.791 0.924 -2.670 2.779 3.308 16.569 
18 87 0.085 0.979 1.234 -3.060 2.775 4.886 31.881 
19 87 0.115 1.135 1.445 -3.007 2.939 4.852 30.183 
20 87 0.140 1.476 1.916 -2.753 3.025 4.597 27.909 
21 87 0.101 1.150 1.399 -2.768 2.921 3.818 20.848 
22 87 0.065 0.787 0.909 -2.637 2.921 3.053 14.250 
23 87 0.089 0.987 1.166 -2.843 2.729 3.409 17.634 
24 87 0.074 0.828 0.923 -2.825 2.816 2.246 7.192 
25 87 0.078 0.810 0.911 -2.678 2.808 2.432 7.661 
26 87 0.105 1.012 1.157 -2.781 2.857 2.665 9.128 
27 87 0.217 1.300 1.636 -2.895 2.792 4.284 21.934 
28 87 0.260 1.150 1.555 -2.925 2.766 6.230 45.791 
29 87 0.268 1.133 1.569 -2.780 2.787 6.854 54.763 
30 87 0.206 1.023 1.344 -3.168 2.850 5.815 41.726 
31 87 0.130 0.805 0.981 -2.947 2.698 4.294 22.717 
32 87 0.147 0.793 1.033 -2.902 2.798 5.933 43.666 
33 87 0.133 0.618 0.828 -2.826 2.682 6.644 52.354 
34 87 0.059 0.345 0.469 -2.903 2.650 5.588 40.718 
35 87 0.065 0.332 0.478 -2.711 2.735 6.706 54.465 
36 87 0.078 0.378 0.523 -2.836 2.740 6.293 49.386 
37 87 0.098 0.454 0.609 -2.799 2.663 6.110 46.626 
38 87 0.024 0.149 0.232 -3.212 2.988 4.405 27.646 
39 87 0.011 0.065 0.140 -2.879 2.698 4.127 24.846 
40 87 0.027 0.147 0.232 -2.537 2.855 4.570 28.741 
41 87 0.071 0.378 0.493 -2.844 2.991 5.010 34.272 
42 86 0.097 0.426 0.562 -2.773 2.782 5.535 39.715 
43 86 0.101 0.460 0.588 -2.746 2.840 4.987 33.265 
44 86 0.172 0.666 0.876 -2.685 2.611 6.199 47.755 
45 86 0.261 0.752 1.044 -2.456 2.554 7.640 65.559 
46 85 0.184 0.658 0.861 -2.742 2.710 6.005 45.316 
47 85 0.206 0.816 0.989 -2.946 2.786 4.117 22.589 
48 85 0.180 0.760 0.874 -2.579 2.500 2.923 10.436 
49 85 0.146 0.591 0.695 -2.894 2.547 3.414 15.167 
50 85 0.193 0.752 0.892 -2.866 2.908 3.635 18.299 
51 85 0.115 0.466 0.555 -2.776 2.536 3.447 17.085 
52 85 0.157 0.643 0.755 -3.030 2.682 3.383 16.504 
53 85 0.153 0.669 0.769 -3.107 2.840 2.916 11.929 
54 85 0.128 0.595 0.652 -2.463 2.404 1.851 3.273 
55 84 0.144 0.679 0.737 -2.367 2.394 1.682 2.459 
56 84 0.142 0.683 0.747 -2.523 2.402 1.845 3.566 
57 84 0.165 0.799 0.873 -2.478 2.419 1.777 3.349 
58 83 0.051 0.259 0.293 -2.668 2.419 1.639 2.767 
59 82 0.041 0.206 0.239 -2.274 2.266 1.639 2.745 
60 82 -0.027 -0.143 -0.117 -2.769 2.307 1.361 1.634 
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